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EX POST FACTO LAWS
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10:
No State shall ... pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law
or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts ....
N.Y. CONsT. art. , § 9:
No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.
SUPREME COURT
DUTCHESS COUNTY
Doe v. Division of Probation and Correction Alternatives'
(decided January 21, 1997)
Petitioner instituted this Article 782 proceeding to annul the
determination by the Division of Probation and Correction
Alternatives [hereinafter "DPCA"] that designated the petitioner
a "sexually violent predator." 3 The Supreme Court, Dutchess
County denied his petition and the proceeding was dismissed.4
In 1992, upon a plea of guilty to sexual abuse in the first
degree, the petitioner was sentenced to a six-month prison term
followed by a five year probationary period.5  With the
1 171 Misc. 2d 210, 654 N.Y.S.2d 268 (1997).
2 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7801 et seq. (McKinney 1994). This statute affords a
petitioner a quick and standardized method of obtaining judicial review and
replaces the antiquated former methods of writs of certiorari to review,
mandamus, and prohibition. Id. However, before a petition is made, the
person seeking relief by an Article 78 proceeding must have had a final order
entered against him and all administrative remedies must have been exhausted.
Id. Article 78 proceedings are barred if a final determination has not yet been
made, the determination is still reviewable by a court or administrative
channels, or if there exists a statutory authorization for the rehearing of the
matter. Id.
3 See infra note 8 and accompanying text.
4 DPCA, 171 Misc. 2d at 211, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 269.
5 Id. at 211, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 269.
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probationary period still running, the legislature of New York
passed the Sex Offender Registration Act6 [hereinafter the
"Act"], which required convicted sex offenders on parole,
probation, or in custody as of the Act's January 21, 1996
effective date to comply with its registration7 and notifications
provisions.' The petitioner, who was assessed by the DPCA as
having a level three designation, 0 the highest level that demarks
the registrant as posing the greatest threat to public safety,
6 N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168 et seq. (McKinney 1997).
' Id. Section 168 (i) provides: "Registration as required by this article shall
consist of a statement in writing signed by the sex offender giving the
information that is required by the division and the division shall enter the
information into an appropriate electronics data base or file." Id. § 168(a)(1)
defines sex offender as including "any person who is convicted of any of the
offenses set forth in subdivision (2) or (3) of this section." § 168(a)(2) lists
the following crimes as "sex offenses": rape in the second or third degree,
sodomy in the second or third degree, and sexual abuse in the second degree as
well as convictions for attempts thereof. § 168(a)(3) lists the following crimes
as "sexually violent offenses:" rape in the first degree and sexual abuse in the
first degree as well as convictions for attempts thereof. The crime for which a
person is convicted will determine the designation level given to the offender
which in turn will determine the level of disclosure to the public that is allowed
under the act. See also infra note 8 and accompanying text.
8 Id. § 168(f)(1) requires the following: "Any sex offender, who is
discharged, paroled or released from any state or local correctional facility,
hospital or institution where he was confined or committed, shall register with
the division within ten calendar days for purposes of verifying such sex
offender's intended place of residence." Id. § 168 (L)(6)(a) provides that
following the board examiners evaluation and recommendation, the act makes
the following notification provisions:
If the risk of repeat offense is low, a level one designation
shall be given to such sex offender .... If the risk of repeat
offense is moderate, a level two designation shall be given to
such sex offender. . . . If the risk of repeat offense is high
and there exists a threat to the public safety, such sex
offender shall be deemed a 'sexually violent predator' and a
level three designation shall be given to such sex offender.
Id.
I DPCA, 171 Misc. 2d at 211-12, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 269.
'0 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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appealed that determination." His appeal was denied 2 and the
petitioner thereafter initiated the instant Article 78 petition. 3
The basis of petitioner's appeal was that Correction Law § 168
et seq. is violative of the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Federal
Constitution 4 in that the imposition of the Act's registration and
notification provisions amount to an increase in the punishment
exacted for a crime after its commission. 15  Additionally,
petitioner contended that the imposition of the statute violated his
due process16 and equal protection 7 rights guaranteed under the
Federal Constitution."
In addressing the petitioner's assertion that the Act is violative
of the prohibition against ex post facto laws, the court referred to
the decision of the United States District Court in Doe v. Pataki. '9
" DPCA, 171 Misc. 2d at 212-13, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
12 Id. at 213, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
13 id.
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The Ex Post Facto Clause provides that
"No state shall... pass.. .ex post facto law[s]." Id.
15 DPCA, 171 Misc. 2d at 213-14, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
16 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This section provides: "No State
shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." Id.
17 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. This section provides: "No State
shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." Id.
'
8DPCA, 171 Misc. 2d at 213, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 270.
"9 Doe v. Pataki, 940 F .Supp. 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). In Paraki, a group of
sex offenders had filed a suit that sought to challenge the New York State Sex
Offender's Act as being in violation of the Ex Post Facto clause of the Federal
Constitution if held applicable to individuals who had committed their crimes
before the January 21, 1996 effective date. Id. at 604. The court determined
that the notification provision of the Act did indeed violate this clause because
the Act's intent, design, effect and historical roots (of "branding and other
public forms of shaming") were punitive in nature. Id. at 604-05. The court
summarized "[i]f a law increases punishment, it cannot be applied
retroactively even if it would also prevent further acts of violence and abuse."
Id. at 605. The court did however hold that the registration provision of the
Act did not violate any ex post facto concerns because it did "not result in the
same excesses or adverse consequences that follow public notification." Id.
In accordance with this finding the Pataki court granted summary judgment for
the plaintiffs "with respect to the notification provision of the Act" and
1998 1037
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In Doe, the court enjoined the imposition of the notification
provision of the Act20 but upheld the registration provision."
With the notification provision of the Act enjoined by the Pataki
court, the DPCA court held that petitioner's challenge to the
notification provision was not ripe for review' and that they
would not address his contentions regarding that aspect of the
Act.2
Turning to the petitioner's challenge to the constitutionality of
the registration provision of the act, the DPCA court relied upon
DeVeau v. Braisted,24 a United States Supreme Court case, and
found that this provision did not violate the prohibition against
enacting ex post facto laws.25 In DeVeau, the Court reasoned that
the appropriate question to be asked in determining whether a law
violates the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Federal Constitution was
to assess the legislative aim of the law.26 If the aim was to punish
an individual for past activity, the legislation was
unconstitutional.27 If however, the effect of the law came about
as a "relevant incident" to a present situation, then no violation
granted summary judgment for the "defendants with respect to the registration
provision of the Act." Id.
20 Id. at 605.
21 Id.
22 BLACK'S LAW DICriONARY 1328 (6th ed. 1990). The ripeness doctrine
stands for the principle that "the courts ... will not act when the issue is only
hypothetical or the existence of a controversy is merely speculative." Id.
I Doe v. DPCA, 171 Misc. 2d 210, 213, 654 N.Y.S.2d 268, 270 (Sup. Ct.
Dutchess County 1997).
24 DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960). In Deveau, union officials
challenge the constitutionality of an act that prohibited anyone convicted of a
felony to collect dues for the union unless that official has been subsequently
pardoned or receives a special certificate of good conduct. Id. In a five to
three decision, the court ruled that "the proof is overwhelming that New York
sought not to punish ex-felons, but to devise what was felt to be a much-
needed scheme of regulation of the waterfront, and for the effectuation of that
scheme it became important whether individuals had previously been convicted
of felony." Id at 160. In consequence, the court held that the act did not
violate the prohibition against passing ex post facto laws. Id.
2 DPCA, 171 Misc. 2d at 214, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 270.26DeVeau, 363 U.S. at 160.
27Id.
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exits.u Admonishing this, the DPCA court easily found that the
Act's design was "remedial rather than punitive" in that the
registration provided law enforcement with information that could
be used to prevent sexual victimization.29 Further, the court
stated that registration would also help law enforcement "resolve
incidents involving sexual abuse and exploitation promptly." 3"
Consequently, the court held that petitioner's argument that the
registration provision of the Act is unconstitutional was rejected. 3
Next, petitioner claimed a denial of his due process rights"
because his labeling as a level three sex offender was made
"without any input from him and he had no right to confront
witnesses, be represented by counsel, present evidence, or appeal
the DPCA's determination."33 Admitting this issue to be one of
first impression, the DPCA court cited to the United States
Supreme Court case of Mullane v. Central Hanover.3 In
Mullane, the Court held that whenever a proceeding is to be
accorded finality "notice reasonably calculated under all
circumstances to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the
action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections"
is required.3 The DPCA court found constitutional sufficiency in
that the statute provided notice of the impending classification,
28 Id. at 160.
29 DPCA, 171 Misc. 2d at 214, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 271.
30 id. at 214, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 271.
31 Id. at 216, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 272.
32 See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
33 DPCA, 171 Misc. 2d at 214, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 271.
3 339 U.S. 306 (1950). In Mullane, a New York statute was reviewed by
the Supreme Court of the United States to determine if the notice provided by
a Trust Co.'s publication in a local paper (as proscribed by the statute) was
sufficient to afford interested beneficiaries due process of the law. Id. at 311.
The publication announced the name and address of the Trust company, the
name and date of the common fund's creation, and a list of all participating
estates, trusts or funds. Id. at 310. The Court held that it was sufficient
notice to beneficiaries whose address was unknown to the Trust company, but
held as insufficient regarding parties whose address was known. Id. at 319.
For these individuals the Court noted that notice by a direct mailing would be
sufficient. Id. at 319.
35Id. at 314
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the availability of an administrative review process, the
availability of an Article 78 proceeding and a procedure for relief
in the sentencing court.36 Accordingly, it rejected the petitioner's
claim of a deprivation of due process rights.3
Finally, the petitioner claimed that the Act deprived him of his
equal protection rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution
because his risk assessment was made by the DPCA whereas sex
offenders incarcerated at the time the statute took effect were
assessed by the court. 38 The DPCA court rejected petitioner's
claim and found that a rational basis existed for the statute's
proscribing the task of risk assessment for sex offender's on
parole to the DPCA.39 The court agreed with the logic of the Act
that the DPCA, already in a supervisory role for the paroled
offender, is best suited to make a determination in the risk level
of that individual." The court recognized a great difference in
those that are incarcerated and about to be freed and those
already out on parole and reporting to an agency such as the
DPCA.4 In consequence they held a claim of equal protection
violations must fail.42
In summary, the DPCA court applied federal law to find that
the registration provision of the New York State Sex Offender's
Act was non-punitive in nature and therefore did not pose any ex
post facto problems.43 The DPCA court also summarily dismissed
the petitioner's due process and equal protection claims after
finding that the act provided reasonable notice and an opportunity
to protest the classification assessment and that a rational basis
existed for distinguishing prisoners about to be released from
prison and those already out and on parole."
36 DPCA, 171 Misc. 2d at 215, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 271.
37 id.38DPCA, 171 Misc. 2d at 215, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 271.
39 Id. 654 N.Y.S.2d at 271.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 216-17, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 272.
431d. at 214, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 271.
44d. at 215, 654 N.Y.S.2d at 271.
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